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Key Highlights of Introduction
•	 The intentional release of a biological agent may 
initially be difficult to discern from a natural incident, 
which can result in separate law enforcement and 
public health investigations. 
•	 It is in public health and law enforcement’s best 
interest to work together when first investigating 
a suspicious biological outbreak, which includes 
fostering mutual awareness and establishing joint 
communication procedures. 
•	 By working together, public health and law 
enforcement can achieve their separate but often 
overlapping objectives of identifying the biological 
agent, preventing the spread of the disease, 
preventing public panic, and apprehending those 
responsible. 
•	 Law enforcement and public health are encouraged 
to read the entire handbook and not limit their review 
to just their respective sections, so each community 
can understand the different goals and needs of the 
other organization. 
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Terrorists have demonstrated their willingness to employ non-traditional weapons 
to achieve their desired outcomes. One such class of these weapons is biological 
agents, which pose challenges to both law enforcement and public health due to 
their unique characteristics. Since biological agents are often endemic or naturally 
occurring in the environment, an intentional release of a pathogen may be initially 
difficult to discern from a natural event, and efforts to respond to the attack and 
apprehend those responsible may be delayed. 
In the past, it was common for law enforcement and public health to conduct 
separate and independent investigations. Due to the challenges posed by 
a biological threat, an effective response calls for a high level of cooperation 
between these two disciplines. The lack of mutual awareness and understanding, 
as well as the absence of established communication procedures, could limit the 
effectiveness of these disciplines’ separate, but often overlapping, investigations. 
The effective use of all resources during a suspicious biological incident is critical 
to maximizing an efficient and appropriate response. 
By working together, public health and law enforcement can achieve their 
shared objectives of identifying the biological agent, preventing the spread of 
the disease, preventing public panic, and apprehending those responsible. 
PURPOSE
This handbook was developed to facilitate the use of resources and maximize 
communication and interaction among law enforcement and public health in an 
effort to minimize potential barriers during a response to a biological threat. 
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Specifically, this handbook aims to: 
•		 Provide an overview of both law enforcement and public 

health to enhance the appreciation and understanding of 

each discipline’s expertise
	
•		 Discuss criminal and epidemiological investigational 

procedures and methodologies for a response to a 

biological threat
	
•		 Identify challenges to sharing information and provide 

potential solutions that may be adapted to meet the 

needs of the various agencies and jurisdictions
	
•		 Demonstrate effective law enforcement and public 

health collaboration
	
Law enforcement and public health are encouraged to read the entire 
handbook and not limit their review to just their respective sections.
It is important to take the time to understand the different goals and needs
of each other’s organization before a suspicious biological event occurs. 
Doing so will enable law enforcement and public health personnel to more 
effectively respond in a coordinated manner during a biological threat incident. 
While both disciplines have varying objectives and protocols, both public 
health and law enforcement ultimately share three common concerns: 
•		 Early identification of an outbreak 
•		 Determining whether the outbreak is intentional or naturally occurring 
•		 Protecting public health and public safety 
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Even with these common concerns, each discipline may be hesitant to share 
information because of actual or perceived limitations or barriers. Identifying 
and resolving these issues in advance of a biological threat will help facilitate 
a more effective dialogue and information exchange, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of identifying an incident and protecting public health and safety 
in a more efficient manner. Simply put, working together helps both law 
enforcement and public health achieve their separate but often overlapping 
goals and ultimately allows for a more effective and efficient response to a 
biological threat. 
10 
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Key Highlights of Public Health
•		 The ultimate aim of an epidemiological investigation is to 
identify the source of the disease and implement efforts 
to control the outbreak and protect the public’s health. 
•	 An epidemiological investigation primarily involves the 
meticulous accumulation of information from patient 
interviews and surveys as well as data collected from 
surveillance systems. 
•	 Goals of an epidemiological investigation include: 
•	 Stopping the spread of disease (identify causative 
agent, determine source, mode of transmission 
and population at risk) 
•	 Protecting the public’s health (surveillance, 
medical countermeasures, public education) 
•	 Protecting public health and other response 
personnel (protective equipment and preventive 
vaccines/medications) 
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•		 Important elements of an epidemiological investigation are: 
•	 Detect unusual events 
•	 Confirm diagnosis 
•	 Identify and characterize additional cases 
•	 Determine source of exposure 
•	 Develop and implement interventions 
•		 Laboratory analysis of clinical specimens is used to 
assist the physician in making a definitive diagnosis. 
While most physicians will wait for definitive laboratory 
results to confirm a biological threat agent diagnosis, 
physicians are likely to begin treatment before laboratory
test results are confirmed since early treatment of disease
increases the probability the patient will recover from 
the illness. 
•		 A laboratory that tests for biological agents should meet 
applicable standards (e.g., quality control measures, 
biosafety, biosecurity) and participate in relevant 
proficiency testing. 
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EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION GOALS 
Epidemiology is the fundamental science of public health. According to the 
World Health Organization (WHO), “Epidemiology is the study of the distribution 
and determinants of health-related states or events (including disease), and the 
application of this study to the control of diseases and other health problems”. In 
other words, epidemiologists study diseases or events that impact human health 
in order to reduce disease or disability in a population. Whether it is in response 
to a naturally occurring outbreak or a biological threat, public health will conduct 
an epidemiological investigation to gather information that will move investigators 
toward determining the source of the disease and the extent of the outbreak. 
When conducting an epidemiological investigation for a naturally occurring 
outbreak or biological threat, public health has the following basic goals: 
•	 To stop the spread of disease – One of the most basic missions 
of public health is the prevention of illness in the population. While 
physicians focus on curing the sick and promoting health in the 
individual, public health strives for health promotion and disease 
prevention in the entire population. Epidemiologists use interviews, 
surveys and data analysis to identify the causative agent and 
determine the source, mode of transmission, and the population 
at risk for the illness under investigation to limit the spread of
the outbreak. 
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•	 To protect the public – Public health utilizes surveillance of health 
trends, medical information, and a variety of analytical tools to 
establish methods and implement interventions that protect 
the public from health threats. Vaccine campaigns, medical 
countermeasure distribution programs, disease surveillance, 
and health education all play a role in preventing and responding 
to serious health emergencies. 
•	 To protect public health and other response personnel – A major 
consideration during an investigation is the protection of responders. 
Since epidemiologists and other responders may come in contact 
with potentially infectious individuals, provision of proper protective 
equipment and preventive medications or vaccines for 
investigative personnel is essential. 
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIVE METHODS
Public health uses investigative techniques to identify the causative agent 
and determine the source and extent of disease outbreaks (See Figure 1). 
An epidemiological investigation primarily involves the meticulous accumulation 
of information from patient interviews and surveys as well as data collected 
from surveillance systems. Since interview or disease surveillance information 
may be relevant to a criminal investigation, law enforcement should become 
familiar with the elements of an epidemiological investigation. 
  
 
 
 
  
16 
The following section provides a brief synopsis of the elements of an 
epidemiological investigation. 
In an epidemiological investigation, the nature of each outbreak and the 
availability of personnel and resources will determine the sequence and 
scope of the actions that will be performed during the investigation. 
Detect Unusual Events 
The first indication of an unusual event is often an unexpected increase in the 
number of people with similar symptoms, referred to as cases. This increase 
in cases is detected either by monitoring surveillance systems or receiving 
notifiable disease reports from healthcare providers. If an unexpected increase 
occurs, public health will begin to collect additional patient information, as
Epidemiological
Investigation 
Confirm 
diagnosis 
Detect 
unusual 
events 
Develop and 
implement 
interventions 
Identify 
additional 
cases 
Characterize 
additional 
cases 
Determine 
source of 
exposure 
Figure 1. Elements of an epidemiological investigation. 
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well as further characterize the illness to determine the nature of the incident. 
Based on the information collected, the incident may be classified as an 
infectious disease outbreak and public health would begin an epidemiological 
investigation to determine the extent and source of the outbreak. 
An outbreak is defined as an occurrence of cases associated with a specific 
place or group of people over a given period of time. For example, public health 
may determine that 15 cases of E. coli O157:H7 infection were due to victims 
having recently consumed unpasteurized apple cider from a local orchard in 
the last month. Since all of the cases have an association with the orchard 
over a similar period, public health may consider this an outbreak. For rare or 
uncommon diseases (e.g., botulism, SARS), public health may determine that a 
single case of the disease constitutes an outbreak since cases are not normally 
observed in their jurisdiction. 
Case Reporting 
Generally, case reports of disease are submitted to public health by physicians, 
laboratories, or other healthcare practitioners. Depending on national or local 
statutes or authorities, it may be mandatory for case reports of disease to be 
reported to public health once a biological agent is identified. If reporting is not 
mandatory, healthcare providers should be encouraged to voluntarily submit 
case reports to public health. 
While disease case reporting is standard practice for identifying unusual events, 
it is a time and resource intensive process that can be adversely impacted by 
delays in symptom onset, clinical diagnosis, laboratory testing and results 
reporting. Depending on the illness, it may be days or weeks before public health 
is notified by a healthcare provider or laboratory of a case report. (See Figure 2). 
18 
  
 
  Figure 2.1 A depiction of the typical reporting time from initial exposure to receipt by public health.
Typically, a person is exposed to a pathogen and may experience symptoms within a few days. After 
a patient is seen by a physician, specimens are collected and sent to a clinical laboratory for initial 
diagnostic testing. Results are provided within a few days. If specimens are positive for a reportable 
disease, public health is notified of the case and specimens may be sent to a public health laboratory 
for additional testing. 
Frequent and timely disease reports are critical for detecting outbreaks; identifying
populations or geographic areas at high risk; developing, implementing, and 
evaluating prevention strategies; and improving public health policies. 
1 Courtesy of New Mexico Department of Health 
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Surveillance Systems 
Public health surveillance is defined as the ongoing collection, analysis, and 
interpretation of health data for use in the planning, implementation, and 
evaluation of public health practices. Generally, public health tends to rely on 
passive methods of disease detection. This may include receiving case reports 
from physicians, laboratories, or other individuals or institutions as mandated by 
law. However, in the event of an outbreak or other event of public health concern, 
more active surveillance techniques may be used, in which public health will 
regularly contact reporting sources to obtain information. Any surveillance system 
must include the capacity for collecting and analyzing data, as well as the means
to disseminate the data to individuals or groups involved in disease prevention 
and control activities. 
Ideally, a surveillance system will detect the occurrence of disease within a 
sufficient time frame that allows public health to initiate an investigation and 
implement timely prevention and control programs, thereby limiting any 
impact on the public. For example, early detection of a contagious disease, 
like influenza, allows for implementation of a vaccination program that would 
greatly reduce the spread of disease and the number of people affected. 
For incidents involving biological threats, public health will want to decrease 
the length of time between exposure and traditional disease reporting. To assist 
with this process, public health may utilize a syndromic surveillance system 
to track pre-clinical healthcare indicators. Syndromic surveillance is a system 
that relies on existing health data to identify clusters of disease, prior to clinical 
diagnosis or laboratory testing, or to look for disease symptoms that indicate 
patients are being misdiagnosed. (For example, since the initial symptoms of 
anthrax are similar to those of influenza, doctors might be calling the disease 
influenza or pneumonia. But the grouping of symptoms could indicate an issue). 
20 
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  The advantage of syndromic surveillance is that it may provide initial indication of 
an outbreak, track the size, spread, and tempo of an outbreak, monitor disease 
trends or provide evidence that an outbreak has not occurred.2,3 
Some healthcare indicators found in syndromic surveillance systems may include: 
• Number of upper respiratory disease cases seen in emergency departments
• Number of ambulance runs within an allotted period of time 
• Number of antibiotics or over-the-counter drugs sold at pharmacies 
It should be noted that syndromic surveillance is not guaranteed to detect the 
occurrence of an outbreak and does not replace other surveillance methods or 
direct case reporting to public health. However, it is a useful tool that enhances 
collaboration among public health, healthcare providers, information system 
professionals, academic investigators, and industry.3 Since many biological threat 
agents cause illness with symptoms similar to common ailments, supporters of 
syndromic surveillance believe that monitoring and analyzing healthcare indicator 
data will allow for rapid detection of covert biological threats. 
Confirm the Diagnosis
Diagnosing the potential disease agent often begins with healthcare providers 
obtaining medical histories and conducting physical examinations of affected 
individuals. A medical history is the record of medical information gained by a 
physician during an exam and usually includes information on symptoms, recent 
events, travel, or any unusual circumstances that may contribute to an illness. 
Based on this information, physicians or public health may request laboratory 
tests to confirm the clinical diagnosis. 
2 CDC. PHIN Messaging guide for syndromic surveillance: Emergency department, urgent care, and inpatient settings. HL7 Version 
2.5.1. April. 2013
	
3 Henning, K. Overview of Syndromic Surveillance What is Syndromic Surveillance. MMWR. September 24, 2004 (Suppl); 5-11.
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Laboratory Analysis of Specimens and Samples 
Diagnosing an illness by clinical signs and symptoms can be imprecise due to 
the nature and progression of the disease, especially for many biological threat 
agents, since they initially present symptoms similar to common infectious 
diseases (e.g., influenza). Therefore, laboratory analysis of clinical specimens 
is used to assist the physician in making a definitive diagnosis. Most physicians 
will wait for definitive laboratory results prior to confirming the diagnosis if a 
biological threat agent is suspected. However, physicians are likely to begin 
treatment before laboratory test results are available since early treatment of 
disease increases the probability the patient will recover from the illness, 
especially for biological threat agents. 
The materials that are typically collected to support a diagnosis or assist with 
a public health investigation may be clinical specimens (e.g., tissues, blood, 
sputum) or environmental samples (e.g., food, water, air, dusts, powders, surface 
swabs). Some environmental samples may be considered hazardous materials 
and require specialized training and equipment for collection. Other samples 
consist of living, intact materials, necessitating refrigerated or frozen transport 
of materials (i.e., cold chain) and/or extremely rapid delivery. Not all laboratories 
possess the capabilities to test for every biological threat agent; this may require 
specimens or samples to be transported to another laboratory with adequate 
expertise and capacities. 
Laboratories vary in their ability to test for biological agents. For example, forensic
laboratories that process criminal evidence may not be equipped to test for 
biological agents or know how to handle these specimens appropriately. Before 
testing specimens/samples for biological agents, laboratories should meet 
appropriate standards (e.g., quality, biosafety, biosecurity). Additionally, these 
laboratories should continue to demonstrate their readiness through proficiency 
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tests that validate their ability to correctly identify biological agents. Sending a 
specimen/sample to a laboratory that is not equipped to perform testing could 
dramatically delay the investigation and destroy material required to confirm 
the agent’s identity and properly diagnose the causative agent of an illness.
Identify and Characterize Additional Cases 
The process of identifying and characterizing additional cases in an epidemiological
investigation is very similar to that of a law enforcement investigation. In both 
disciplines, a generous amount of time and resources is required to obtain 
additional investigative information through interviews with cases and other 
contacts. 
The first confirmed case of an outbreak is referred to as the index case. To 
prevent further impact and to try and find the source of the disease, there is a 
need to identify new, unreported or unrecognized cases and their contacts. In 
the search for additional cases, public health will interview family members, 
associates, co-workers, and other possible contacts of the index case. These 
interviews require extensive time and personnel commitments. Interviewees 
may be contacted multiple times as the investigation proceeds if there is a 
need to obtain additional information. Information collected by public health 
can include the following: 
•		Demographic data (name, address, age, race, ethnicity, gender) 
•		Clinical data (signs and symptoms, duration, onset) 
•		Exposure history (travel, meals, and significant events; all based 

on the type of illness suspected) 

•		Case contacts and knowledge of other cases 
23 Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to interviewing the index case and contacts, public health will attempt
to identify additional cases by using a set of uniformed criteria, called a case 
definition. Public health provides the case definition to physicians, hospitals, 
and other health officials to identify any additional cases that may be related 
to the outbreak, both within and outside their jurisdiction. 
Public health may also solicit assistance from the media in trying to identify
additional cases. For example, public health may work with the media to inform
the public that anyone with a certain type of skin rash and fever may have been
exposed to a biological agent and should report to a physician for an examination.
Once additional cases have been identified, public health will collect information
on each one to determine whether their illness could be associated with
the outbreak. 
Determine the Source of Exposure 
Once the case/contact interview information has been collected, it is analyzed 
to identify common exposures and, ultimately, to suggest the source of illness. 
This process is known as descriptive epidemiology. 
An example of descriptive epidemiology is the creation of a histogram (a bar 
graph that estimates a probability distribution) in which the number of disease 
cases are plotted by date or time of onset in order to visualize the progression 
of the outbreak. This bar graph, called an epidemic curve or epi curve, provides 
a visual representation of an outbreak’s magnitude over a specific time period 
and can provide critical clues regarding the outbreak’s onset and duration. 
(See next page, Figure 3) 
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Figure 3. The Epi Curve.4 
This is a diagram of the number of cases of E. coli 0157:H7 infection that were associated with
 this outbreak when they occurred. This graph, known as an epi curve, helps public health 
determine the source and spread of an outbreak. 
Once the descriptive epidemiology has been reviewed, public health will try 
to develop a “best guess” for the source(s) of illness. This best, or informed, 
guess is known as a hypothesis. For example, if multiple cases shared an 
exposure, such as attending the same organized event, then public health 
may develop a hypothesis that the common event is the source of disease. 
During an epidemiological investigation, public health may develop several 
hypotheses about the cause of the outbreak as they accumulate additional 
clinical, laboratory, and investigative information. To determine whether a 
hypothesis is correct, public health conducts a statistical analysis or study 
of data obtained using a standardized survey instrument or questionnaire. 
4 Stehr-Green J. (2002)_Multi state Outbreak of E. coli 0157:H7 Infection. Instructor’s Version. Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/ 
epicasestudies/downloads/ecolii.pdf. 
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This process is known as analytical epidemiology. The statistical analysis 
provides public health with mathematical evidence to confirm or reject a 
hypothesis. If the analysis confirms a hypothesis then public health will 
develop and implement an intervention to prevent people from becoming ill. 
If a hypothesis rejected by the analysis, then public health will develop a 
new hypothesis and continue to search for more cases in order to obtain 
additional information. 
Develop and Implement Interventions 
The ultimate aim of an epidemiological investigation is to identify the source 
of the disease and implement a plan to control the outbreak and protect the 
public’s health. Often there is a need to develop and implement an intervention 
before the disease agent has been confirmed in order to ensure a successful 
intervention. Many illnesses, including those caused by biological threat agents, 
can be treated successfully if antibiotics or antivirals are provided early in the 
course of the illness. Also, quarantine (restricting movement of healthy people 
who may have been exposed to a contagious disease) or isolation (separating 
ill persons who have a contagious disease from those who are healthy) 
measures may be used to control spread of a contagious disease; however,
 these measures must be implemented early in an outbreak to be effective. 
Some control measures may be directed at the environment to remove the 
source (e.g., insects, contaminated food) of transmission. 
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Key Highlights of Law Enforcement 
•		 Primary goals of a criminal investigation for a biological
threat include: 
• To protect the health and safety of the public 
• To prevent subsequent attacks 
• To identify, apprehend, and prosecute the 
perpetrators 
• To protect law enforcement personnel 
•		 If public health and law enforcement have established 
a working relationship prior to a biological threat 
incident, public health may feel more comfortable 
contacting law enforcement early in their investigation. 
•		 Law enforcement should include various subject matter 
experts, such as public health, to assist in determining 
the credibility of a biological threat. 
28 
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•	 Once there is suspicion that a crime has occurred, 
chain of custody procedures should be implemented 
by both law enforcement and public health to ensure 
accountability of evidence. Failure to properly maintain 
the chain of custody may render evidence unusable 
at trial. 
•		 In certain situations the environment might be 
contaminated. Therefore, it is useful to have 
specially trained law enforcement teams to handle 
apprehension of the suspect and collection of 
evidence in contaminated environments. 
•		 The need for rapid collection and testing to save lives 
outweighs normal evidence collection procedures. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION GOALS 
During a biological threat incident, law enforcement agencies’ primary goals 
include: 
•	 To prevent a criminal act and subsequent attacks – Through ongoing 
surveillance, investigation, and intelligence-gathering techniques, law 
enforcement personnel work to gather information to identify potential 
terrorists, their targets, and methods of attack before an attack takes 
place, or to prevent subsequent attacks from being carried out. 
•	 To identify, apprehend, and prosecute the perpetrators – Once a 
biological attack occurs, law enforcement gathers evidence and 
information to identify and apprehend the individual(s) responsible 
for the attack. Collection of evidence includes interviewing victims 
and witnesses as well as obtaining and preserving physical evidence. 
A criminal investigation of a biological attack is not complete until 
there is a successful prosecution and conviction of those responsible 
for the attack. 
•	 To protect law enforcement personnel – Law enforcement personnel 
are likely to encounter situations where they may be at risk for 
exposure to a biological agent. Since some biological agents
can be both infectious (can infect a person) and contagious (can 
spread from person to person), provision of proper personal 
protective equipment (PPE) and other preventive medications or
vaccines for law enforcement personnel is essential. 
30 
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PREVENTING BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS 
The first step in preventing a biological attack is to attempt to identify potential 
terrorists or terrorist organizations that are both capable of and have intent to 
execute a biological attack. This process allows law enforcement officials to 
identify potential targets and possible modes of attack. Despite all efforts, a 
biological attack may not be prevented. Therefore, appropriate law enforcement 
agencies must be prepared to respond to an incident either while it is occurring 
or after it has occurred. Soft targets are often more appealing than solid or more 
stable targets, therefore, a country’s strong response capability to a biological
 attack might result in a deterrent for terrorists choosing a pathogen as their 
method of attack. 
Evaluating the Threat: Real or Hoax 
Law enforcement personnel may be confronted with a number of situations 
involving the actual or threatened use of a biological agent as a weapon. 
These situations may include non-credible threats (hoaxes), announcements 
or indications that a release of a biological agent has occurred (overt), or 
unannounced releases of a biological agent (covert). 
During a covert event, the public health and medical community will likely be 
first to identify an occurrence of a biological threat as patients seeking treatment 
for an unexplained illness can often be a first indication of an attack. As soon as 
public health suspects an intentional event or is confronted with a case of illness 
caused by an agent or toxin of concern, they should notify law enforcement to 
determine the likelihood of an intentional biological attack. If public health and 
law enforcement have established a working relationship prior to a biological 
threat incident, public health may feel more comfortable contacting their law 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
enforcement counterparts early in the investigation, allowing for a more rapid 
initiation of the threat evaluation process. 
All situations involving the suspected intentional misuse of a biological agent 
require a law enforcement-led threat credibility evaluation (see next page, 
Figure 4), an assessment to determine how credible the threat is and what 
further action should be taken to mitigate the threat. A threat credibility 
evaluation should consist of three factors, plus an assessment of available 
intelligence and/or case information to determine the credibility of a threat: 
•	 Technical Feasibility – Does the threat require technical expertise; 
if so, are those involved technically competent? (Will it work?) 
•	 Operational Practicality – Does the operation that is used to carry 
out the threat seem practical? (Can it be done?) 
•	 Adversarial Intent – Does the person display the behavioral 

resolve to carry out the operation? (Would the person do it?)
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Threat Credibility Evaluation 
During the course of the threat credibility evaluation, law enforcement may 
contact various partners and subject matter experts, notably public health, to 
assist in determining the threat credibility. After the threat has been deemed 
credible, involved parties should consult to determine the next course of action, 
specifically regarding how to best collect and analyze the evidence, including 
biological environmental samples. If the threat is deemed non-credible, law 
enforcement may initiate an investigation to identify and prosecute those 
responsible for creating the perception of a threat (i.e., a hoax). 
Figure 4. Threat Credibility Evaluation.
When a threat is made, law enforcement should lead a threat credibility evaluation to determine 
how credible the threat is an what further action should be taken to mitigate the threat. 
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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE METHODS 
Law enforcement personnel conducting criminal investigations must operate 
within the applicable laws governing the investigations and the ensuing 
prosecution. As information is collected, it is necessary for law enforcement 
to develop a thorough understanding of the investigation and the unique 
circumstances of the case. This will help law enforcement to identify any 
missing or weak evidence, which may impact the ability to apprehend, 
prosecute, and convict the individual(s) responsible for committing the crime.
A brief summary of criminal investigative methods is provided below. (See 
Figure 5). While some aspects of a criminal investigation may occur 
sequentially, they can also take place simultaneously. 
Criminal 
Investigation 
Gather 
Evidence 
Evaluate 
Evidence 
Apprehend
Suspects 
Provide 
Testimony 
Figure 5. Elements of a criminal investigation. 
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Gather Evidence 
The process of gathering evidence during the criminal investigation of a potential 
biological threat will involve collection of physical evidence (e.g., dissemination 
devices, clothing of victims and suspects), clinical specimens (e.g., blood or 
other bodily secretions), documents, photographs, and witness statements. Law 
enforcement must consider a variety of issues to ensure that any evidence they 
gather can ultimately be used in a criminal prosecution. Similar to other criminal 
investigations, in the event a pathogen is intentionally released, investigators 
are unaware of what is and is not a critical piece of evidence needed to identify, 
arrest, and convict those responsible for the criminal act. 
The list below provides a summary of some of the key issues law enforcement 
must consider when gathering evidence. 
• Chain of Custody – It is important to ensure a methodology is used 
to track and maintain control and accountability of all evidentiary 
items during a criminal investigation. A strict methodology allows for 
accountability of evidence from the time of collection to the time of 
trial. Failure to properly maintain the chain of custody may render 
the evidence unusable at trial if law enforcement is not able to 
unequivocally state where the evidence was located and who had 
access during the time the evidence was in custody. Both law 
enforcement and public health must provide accountability at each 
stage of collection, handling, testing, storing, transporting of the 
evidentiary items, and reporting any test results. Responders should 
implement formalized chain of custody procedures once there is 
suspicion that a crime has occurred. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•	 Delivery of Biological Samples to Laboratory – Laboratories vary in 
their ability to test for biological agents. For example, forensic laboratories
that process criminal evidence may not be equipped to test for biological
agents or know how to handle these specimens appropriately. When 
submitting biological samples, it is important to ensure the laboratory 
receiving the sample is qualified and proficient in testing and familiar 
with the chain of custody procedures. Submitting evidentiary biologi-
cal samples to unqualified laboratories may result in delays, improper 
analyses, or unintentional contamination of samples, which could 
ultimately create doubt surrounding the validity of test results in court. 
•	 Documents – Original documents should be obtained by law 
enforcement when possible. Issues of authenticity and admissibility 
as evidence arise if copies are relied upon when original documents 
are available given that a copy could have been modified from the 
original.5 Example documents that law enforcement might gather 
as evidence include laboratory results or financial statements. 
•	 Witness Statements – Witness descriptions of dissemination 

devices, vehicles, suspects, odors, tastes, sounds, and other 

specific information must be obtained as soon as possible 
following a potential pathogen release. Witness information is 
time sensitive and the sooner the information can be obtained, 
evaluated, and disseminated to other investigators, the more 
value it adds to the investigation. As time passes, a witness’s 
memory can fade or become influenced by the opinion of 
other individuals. 
5 Potentially contaminated documents should be stored and examined utilizing procedures which protect both the individuals handling 
the evidence and the evidence itself. 
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During an investigation of a biological threat, law enforcement may need to 
decide between collecting evidence for public safety or for criminal prosecution. 
There may be an overriding need by authorities to identify the agents or 
materials as soon as possible to ensure that the proper response is implemented 
and steps are taken to protect the responders and the public. In this instance, 
the need for rapid collection and testing to save lives outweighs normal evidence 
collection procedures. 
Evaluate Evidence 
As evidence is collected, an ongoing evaluation of the evidence must be part 
of the investigative process. An understanding of evidence types and the rules 
governing its admissibility will lead to better evaluation of the evidence as the 
criminal investigation progresses. While not intended to be all-inclusive, Table 1, 
(next page) identifies and provides a brief explanation of some types of evidence 
collected during a criminal investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TYPE OF 
EVIDENCE EXPLANATION EXAMPLE 
Direct 
Documents, records, physical 
evidence, notes, computer data, 
videotapes, or other types of 
information that directly relate 
to the case. 
Vehicle rental agreements, 
purchase receipts, phone
records, eyewitness statements, 
dissemination devices. 
Circumstantial 
Facts, if proven, that allow the 
investigator to draw conclusions. 
Circumstantial evidence often 
has the same probative or substan-
tiating value as direct evidence. 
Suspect was treated for 
cutaneous anthrax at or about 
the same time a release of 
anthrax was attempted. 
Trace 
Very small particles of matter that 
can be examined microscopically, 
physically, and/or chemically. 
Biological agent residue, 
fingerprints, DNA, biological 
properties of the agent. 
Hearsay 
Statements offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted; the 
person who made the statement is 
unavailable for cross-examination. 
A statement taken from a 
third party who heard another 
person describe seeing the 
suspect spray and substance 
during the time in question. 
Eyewitness 
Testimony 
Observation or sensation personally 
seen, smelled, heard, felt, or tasted. 
Witness reported smelling a 
particular odor, hearing a specific 
sound, or seeing someone. 
Table 1. Types of Evidence Collected During an Investigative Process. 
Generally, law enforcement should be accustomed to receiving results quickly 
when the event is significant, such as a death or high profile crime. Since 
evidence collected in a potentially contaminated environment must be 
assumed to be contaminated, this significantly complicates the evidence 
review and evaluation process. It is useful to have specially trained teams 
to handle the apprehension and collection of evidence in contaminated 
environments. Following the release of a pathogen, law enforcement will
need to have the collected evidence analyzed in a laboratory to support 
and guide their investigation. As mentioned before, only laboratories qualified 
to handle and test biological evidence should accept samples. 
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Once evidence has been collected and analyzed, it is important to submit all 
materials (e.g., statements, laboratory reports, documents, photographs) to 
the prosecutor in an organized manner to ensure all the facts are identified 
before the trial. Sufficient time should be allowed to permit the prosecutor to 
meet with the investigators and witnesses to review all reports, evidence, and 
anticipated testimony. 
Apprehend Suspect(s)
Once the threat to public health and safety has been eliminated, the top priority 
for law enforcement is the apprehension and prosecution of those responsible 
for the attack. During the apprehension of a suspect or group of suspects, law 
enforcement involved in the arrest must take precaution against possible injury 
from the perpetrator(s). It is also possible that the arresting officers will be 
confronted with either a contaminated environment or contaminated evidence. 
Therefore, appropriate PPE and a decontamination process must be utilized 
to prevent contamination by any biological agent in the environment. While 
apprehending the suspects is a goal of the criminal investigation, the safety 
of the arrest team and the general public is paramount. 
Provide Testimony 
Each law enforcement investigator involved in the case and potential witness 
should be available to meet with the prosecutor before he or she testifies at 
trial. It is important for the prosecutor to have the opportunity to evaluate each 
investigator and witness and his or her statements before appearing in front 
of a jury. During this time, any issues, problems, discrepancies, or gaps in 
evidence or testimony can be discussed and resolved. 
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Summary of Joint Criminal and Epidemiological 
Investigations Model Section 
•		 The Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Model 
is made up of six strategic elements:
• Building relationships 
• Information sharing 
• Joint threat assessment 
• Joint Investigation 
• Memorandum of Understanding/Joint Protocols 
• Joint training/exercises 
•	 Benefits to conducting joint investigations: 
• Law enforcement has access to public health 
experts who understand disease epidemiology 
and can provide relevant medical information. 
• Public health has access to law enforcement case 
information which could assist in identifying the 
source of exposure and containing an outbreak. 
•	 The timely exchange of information in the early stages 
of a response is critical. Both disciplines have access 
to unique information that could help to prevent or 
detect a biological threat. 
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•	 A joint threat assessment, which utilizes the unique 
expertise of both disciplines, can help determine 
more quickly the nature of the incident (intentional 
or natural) and lead to a more appropriate response 
to the threat. 
•	 A joint investigation can maximize the efficiency 
for both law enforcement and public health in the 
event of a biological threat through the exchange 
of real-time investigative information. 
•	 MOU/joint protocols between law enforcement and 
public health are critical in determining roles and 
responsibilities prior to an event occurring and help 
ensure consistent practices between the disciplines. 
Important information to include in MOU/joint 
protocols include: information sharing triggers, joint 
threat assessments, joint investigations, joint interviews, 
and methods for sharing investigative results. 
•	 Joint training and exercises are important elements of 
the Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Model 
since they allow public health and law enforcement 
to test, evaluate and refine their protocols. Amending 
protocols to reflect lessons learned from an exercise is 
particularly important to ensure best practices evolve 
and are strengthened over time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Collaboration between law enforcement and 
public health has not always been recognized 
as beneficial. In the past, it was common for 
law enforcement and public health to conduct 
separate and independent investigations 
during the response to a suspicious biological 
incident. However, a mechanism for increasing cooperation and coordination 
between law enforcement and public health has since been developed, and is 
referred to as the Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Model. This 
model is not solely limited to the investigative process; rather, it incorporates a 
number of procedures and methodologies that require interaction between law 
enforcement and public health prior to the detection of a biological threat and 
through its resulting investigation. 
The Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Model is composed of six 
elements: 
The Joint Criminal-Epidemiological 
Investigations Model highlights 
several practices and procedures 
that can be used by public health 
and law enforcement to increase 
collaboration and partnership. 
Building
Relationships 
Joint 
Investigation 
Information 
Sharing 
Memorandum of 
Understanding
Joint Protocols 
Joint Threat 
Assessment 
Joint Training/
Exercises 
Figure 6. Elements of a Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigation Model. 
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BENEFITS OF THE JOINT CRIMINAL-EPIDMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
MODEL 
Public health and law enforcement share a set of common goals during the 
response to a biological threat, including: 
Protecting
the public
Preventing/ 
stopping 
the spread 
of disease
Identifying
those
responsible
Preventing
future
attacks
Figure 7. Common goals shared between public helath and law enforcement duing a response 
to biological threat. 
The Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Model allows law enforcement 
and public health to achieve their common goals by enabling a more efficient 
response to a biological threat, resulting in earlier detection of an attack, 
identification of a source, and implementation of interventions, thereby 
mitigating the effects of the outbreak. Additionally, this model highlights the 
need to combine the investigative efforts of law enforcement and public health, 
which minimizes potential discrepancies between investigators and maximizes 
the opportunities to identify, apprehend, prosecute and convict the perpetrator 
of the attack. 
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Law Enforcement Benefits 
When operating under the Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Model, 
law enforcement personnel have: 
•	 Access to experts who understand disease epidemiology 

(e.g., symptoms, diagnosis, possible causes) and
	
•	 Access to relevant public health/medical information 

(e.g., results of the epidemiological investigation that may 

inform the criminal investigation).
	
Public Health Benefits 
When operating under the Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Model, 
public health officials have: 
•	 Access to law enforcement case information that may help 

to determine the source of the illness and
	
•	 Assistance in containing the outbreak from law enforcement 
(who can help identify information that may lead to apprehending 
the perpetrator, thus preventing future releases, exposure and illness). 
THE JOINT CRIMINAL-EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS MODEL: 
AN OVERVIEW 
Building Relationships 
Generally, law enforcement and public health may exchange information once 
they confirm the existence of a criminal act or an outbreak. However, waiting 
until a crime or outbreak has been confirmed is too late. For an effective 
response to biological threats, public health and law enforcement need to 
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share information prior to the confirmation that an intentional incident has 
occurred. The timely exchange of information in the early stages of a response 
is critical to containing the outbreak and apprehending the perpetrators. 
Therefore, the Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Model begins 
with the identification of public health and law enforcement contacts prior to 
an incident. 
The purpose of identifying contacts prior to an incident is to initiate dialogue 
between the disciplines in order to build a working relationship. Strong 
personal ties between law enforcement and public health tend to foster 
increased information exchange. Many of the barriers believed to prevent 
collaboration between public health and law enforcement can be overcome 
by developing an understanding of each other’s roles/responsibilities and 
information needs. Over time, public health and law enforcement contacts 
become more familiar with each other and trust is gained, ensuring that 
information can be shared and properly protected. 
Information Sharing 
Both disciplines have access to unique information that may be important 
to share in order to prevent or detect a biological threat (See Figure 8). 
Since neither agency will likely possess all the necessary data for a 
response, information sharing is an essential part of public health and law 
enforcement collaboration. 
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Public Health 
• Disease Clusters/Outbreaks 
• Laboratory Tests 
• Epidemiological Information 
• Patient Information 
The establishment of pre-incident communication mechanisms is essential for 
the expeditious exchange of information during an actual incident. This 
exchange of information requires law enforcement and public health personnel 
to be familiar with one another, and to know who should receive the information. 
Public health and law enforcement are encouraged to notify and involve each 
other early in a potential investigation of a biological threat, even if it turns out to 
be a non-criminal event. 
Information Sharing Challenges
There are challenges to sharing information between public health and law 
enforcement. The challenges are both perceived and real, and should be 
addressed before both disciplines can legally and safely share information and 
conduct joint investigations. 
Public Health Challenges 
A common potential challenge for public health is concern regarding legal liability 
for the release of patient information without the patient’s consent. Individual 
countries may have specific laws indicating that a patient’s medical information 
is confidential. Challenges arise when law enforcement requires access to patient
clinical samples and/or sample results, as well as specific information from patient 
health records from physicians, hospitals, or public health. Due to the protected 
Law Enforcement 
• Terror Groups/Organizations 
• Threats 
• Intelligence 
• Victim Information 
Figure 8. Information that is unique to public health and law enforcement that, if shared, could 
be beneficial to both a criminal and epidemiological investigation. 
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nature of the information, certain challenges are posed to public health when 
law enforcement requires this information as potential evidence of a crime. 
Another potential challenge regarding the exchange of patient information is 
issues of ethics and trust. Patients often provide detailed personal information 
to physicians and public health with the tacit understanding that their information 
will not be disclosed. Public health may be concerned that providing confidential 
patient information to the law enforcement community, regardless of reason or 
intent, jeopardizes their future ability to obtain data critical to identifying an 
outbreak source and implementing effective control measures. 
Law Enforcement Challenges 
Law enforcement may also have concerns regarding the exchange of investigative
information. For any criminal investigation, the more people with access to sensitive
information, the more opportunities exist for inadvertent disclosure. Furthermore, 
the inadvertent release of sensitive information could jeopardize the safety of 
confidential informants or classified sources by allowing the suspects to directly 
identify law enforcement’s source. As a result, suspected perpetrators may 
receive the advanced warning needed to facilitate the destruction of evidence, 
possibly avoid detection, and potentially affect a successful prosecution of 
the perpetrator(s). 
Legal Issues Related to Information Sharing 
Many countries have laws that protect patient confidentiality (sensitive medical 
information). However, patient privacy statutes and regulations can include 
exemptions (e.g., threats to national security, or protecting the health and safety 
of the public) for the release of information to law enforcement. When determining 
the process for sharing information between public health and law enforcement, 
legal counsel should be involved to ensure that the activity complies with all 
applicable statutes for the specific jurisdiction where they will be implemented. 
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The legal basis for allowing patient medical information to be shared with law 
enforcement should be incorporated into a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU)/joint protocol so all entities are properly informed and can comply with 
the regulations surrounding the sharing of information. 
Information Sharing Triggers 
During a biological threat, certain information or a specific event should trigger 
the exchange of information between law enforcement and public health. For 
example, law enforcement conducts criminal investigations every day, and in 
recent years, there have been numerous hoaxes involving biological incidents. 
Therefore, what should prompt the law enforcement community to contact 
public health and involve them in the investigation of such an incident? Similarly, 
epidemiological investigations routinely take place; most are not caused by an 
intentional act. At what point during an epidemiological investigation should 
public health be prompted to contact law enforcement? 
Many factors could provide clues to potential biological threats. The difficulty 
of trying to use definitive criteria is that almost all infections produce initial 
symptoms that mimic other diseases. Furthermore, many biological threat 
agents cause rare, non-endemic, or eradicated diseases, often with unknown 
or poorly characterized etiology. As a result, physicians may not recognize the 
disease until it has progressed to its more serious and unique symptoms. In 
these cases, there may be a reluctance to report this “unknown” illness until a 
definitive diagnosis is made. 
The following tables provide a preliminary list of factors that could trigger public 
health (Table 2) or law enforcement (Table 3) to share information. These tables 
are not intended to be all-inclusive. Law enforcement and public health may 
want to add or remove triggers to suit their individual needs. 
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•	 Any specimens or samples (clinical or environmental) submitted to public health 

for analysis that test positive for a potential biological threat-related agent
	
•	 Large numbers of patients with similar symptoms or disease 
•	 Large numbers of unexplained symptoms, diseases, or deaths 
•	 Disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution (e.g., tularemia 

in a non-endemic area) 

•	 Unusual disease presentation (e.g., inhalational vs. cutaneous anthrax) 
•	 Endemic disease with unexplained increase in incidence (e.g., tularemia, plague) 
•	 Death or illness in humans preceded or accompanied by death or illness in 

animals that is unexplained or attributed to a zoonotic biological agent
	
Table 2. Public Health triggers. 
•	 Any intelligence or indication that any individual or group is unlawfully in possession 

of any biological agent
	
•	 Seizure of bio-processing equipment from any individual, group, or organization 
•	 Seizure of potential dissemination devices from any individual, group, or organization 
•	 Identification or seizure of literature pertaining to the development or dissemination 

of biological agents
	
•	 Any assessments that indicate a credible biological threat exists in an area 
•	 A HAZMAT response that involves the presence of biological agents 
Table 3. Law Enforcement triggers. 
The identification of law enforcement and public health triggers is intended to be 
a starting point to improve information sharing between agencies or jurisdictions. 
The most important aspect of this process is to overcome the hesitation or 
reluctance to share information before all of the facts are known. Early notification 
provides an early warning and should not be viewed negatively. 
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Joint Threat Assessment 
The identification of information or events, particularly when pre-determined 
triggers are met, should always lead to a joint threat assessment by law 
enforcement and public health. A joint threat assessment can be conducted 
in person (on the scene of an event) or over the phone (conference call). 
The outcome of the joint threat assessment is to determine the nature of the 
threat (i.e., credible or not credible). A threat is deemed a “credible threat” 
if it is determined that potential for a real threat does exist. In some countries, 
a threat may also be deemed credible if there is intent to cause terror even 
though no pathogen is used (i.e., an articulated threat in a mailed letter, 
which contains an unknown substance). 
To complement and support the information sharing process, law enforcement 
and public health should establish protocols for conducting a joint threat 
assessment prior to an event. Determining the nature of a reported incident 
(i.e., natural or intentional) and implementing appropriate response activities 
requires a joint assessment by law enforcement and public health. 
A joint threat assessment can be conducted when either discipline identifies 
a defined trigger. During the threat assessment, public health and law 
enforcement will possess critical information that should be shared so that 
the participants can make an informed decision regarding the nature of the 
incident and appropriate follow-up activities. Once all available information 
has been shared, law enforcement and public health should classify the 
incident into one of three risk categories: 
53 Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook
  
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
•	 No Risk: Highly likely the source of exposure occurred 
naturally (not intentional) 
•	 Possible Biological Threat Risk: Information suggests possibility 
that exposure may be a result of an intentional exposure 
•	 Likely Biological Threat Risk: There is a reasonable belief 
the exposure was caused intentionally 
Based on the risk category, public health and law enforcement perform the 
next steps: 
• No Risk: Public health will continue to manage the incident 
• Possible Biological Threat Risk: Parallel investigations or 
joint investigation 
•	 Likely Biological Threat Risk: Joint Investigation 
While the incident may be initially assessed at one of the above risk levels, it 
may be changed as the investigation begins and new information is collected. 
Procedures for conducting joint threat assessments should be decided on prior 
to a potential event and included in an agreed upon protocol between the two 
disciplines. For reference, a sample procedure for conducting a joint threat 
assessment can be found in Appendix 1. 
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Joint Investigation 
The objective of a joint investigation is to maximize the efficiency of both law 
enforcement and public health through the exchange of real-time investigative 
information. When a joint investigation is initiated, law enforcement and public 
health are empowered to share information throughout the course of the 
joint operations. 
The goals of joint investigations are to: 
•	 Identify the disease causing agent 
•	 Identify the source and perpetrators of the attack 
•	 Determine the mode(s) of spread or transmission 

of the biological agent
	
•	 Determine where and when exposure to the biological 

agent may have occurred
 
•	 Identify who may have been exposed. 
Once a decision has been made to work jointly, law enforcement and public 
health should follow previously developed procedures for conducting a joint 
investigation. These procedures should be located in a MOU/joint protocol. 
Joint Investigations – Sharing of Investigative Information 
During a joint investigation it may be difficult for law enforcement and public 
health to know the type of information that can be freely exchanged. As a 
general rule, when conducting joint investigations, law enforcement should 
share relevant criminal investigative information that will be helpful to public 
health in mitigating the effects of the outbreak. Likewise, public health should 
share any epidemiological investigative information that may assist law 
enforcement to identify, apprehend, prosecute, and convict the perpetrator(s). 
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The following tables (Table 4 and Table 5) were developed to assist law 
enforcement and public health in determining the type of information needed 
by the other discipline. 
•	 Time and locations where exposures may have occurred (may be based on agent-specific 
characteristics or other investigational findings) 
•	 Names (including date of birth) for all confirmed, probable, and exposed case-patients 
•	 Positive laboratory results for a biological threat agent from a qualified laboratory 
•	 Case definition (epidemiological picture of the outbreak) 
•	 Risk factors that may be associated with exposure (e.g., demographics, occupation, or 
other activities) 
•	 Hypotheses generated by the epidemiological investigation 
•	 Notification about when public health is planning to conduct interviews with case-patients 
or contacts 
•	 National or international health alerts that may be related to the current biological threat 
•	 Laboratory results used to characterize the specific biological agent (e.g., strain, genetic 
sequencing, antimicrobial resistance) 
•	 Identification of any unusual cases (past case-patients, coroners’ reports.) 
•	 Any other investigative information that may be relevant to the biological threat (e.g., 
requests or theft of antibiotics, identification of a laboratory in someone’s home) 
Table 4. Public Health Information for Law Enforcement. 
•	 Law enforcement investigative information (e.g., interviews scheduled and planned search 
warrants) that may assist public health with the identification of the agent and determination 
of the source of the outbreak 
•	 Information regarding any known group or sector that may be targeted (e.g., government or 
financial, entertainment, religious/ethnic groups) for an attack 
•	 Other law enforcement cases which may have ties to the existing biological threat investigation 
•	 Pre-incident indicators (e.g., videotaping, sketching maps, break-ins, perimeter breaches at
facilities) that may be related to the biological threat incident 
•	 Information developed by law enforcement regarding the biological agent used, mechanism 
for delivery/dissemination, date, time and locations of exposures 
•	 Information regarding any medical equipment, chemicals, toxins, biological agents or labora-
tory supplies stolen, developed, or uncovered that may be related to the biological threat 
•	 Intelligence information regarding the characteristics of the biological agent (e.g., strain, 
antimicrobial resistance, or weaponized nature) 
Table 5. Law Enforcement Information for Public Health. 
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Joint Interviews of Cases and Contacts 
Much of the joint investigation will initially focus on interviews with patients and 
potential contacts that will primarily address where and when exposures to 
biological threat agents may have occurred. While many public health and law 
enforcement investigators may be familiar with conducting interviews, many have 
not practiced or conducted a joint interview with the other discipline present. 
Although a joint interview with law enforcement can provoke anxiety in the patient,
one interview with both agencies present may be less disruptive to the patient 
than two or more separate interviews repeating similar information. Additionally, 
separate questioning by law enforcement and public health may lead to conflicting
statements, which can jeopardize the outcome of the criminal investigation. 
Therefore, a joint interview affords public health and law enforcement the 
opportunity to examine relevant facts based on the unique perspectives of both 
investigators. For reference, a sample procedure for conducting a joint law 
enforcement and public health interview can be found in Appendix 2. 
For public health there are concerns that the presence of law enforcement could 
compromise the collection of sensitive medical information (e.g., illegal drug use) 
by public health. However, a criminal investigation requires interviewing all 
potential witnesses and victims. In order to mitigate patient concerns, a 
provision should be established for confidential communications between 
public health and the interviewee in order to share specific health-related 
information during a joint interview. Special consideration should be made to 
protect the identifying information of the interviewees, due to privacy as well 
as the integrity of a criminal investigation. 
Public health may need to collect some additional information through use of a 
standardized survey instrument or questionnaire, either as part of the interview 
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or afterwards. An epidemiological investigation involves statistical analysis of 
data obtained using a standardized survey instrument or questionnaire. The 
statistical analysis is essential in providing public health with mathematical 
evidence to confirm or reject a hypothesis, which is used to develop and 
implement an intervention to prevent people from becoming ill. 
In some instances, joint interviews may not be possible (e.g., the interviewee 
requests that law enforcement not be present) so each discipline should be 
aware of the types of information their counterpart is seeking. For reference, 
sample questions that may be asked by law enforcement and public health 
can be found in Appendix 3. 
Joint Investigations and the Media 
It is important for law enforcement and public health to coordinate their 
interaction with the media. The media will have a significant impact on the 
response and the public reaction to a biological threat. With public fear and 
the psychological impact of an intentional biological threat, the media will 
aggressively seek information from the investigators. Therefore, law
enforcement and public health must develop a working relationship with
the media to help ensure that timely, useful information is shared with the 
media to keep the public accurately informed, but not overly alarmed. 
Memorandum of Understanding/Joint Protocols 
The creation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and/or joint protocols 
helps to establish joint investigative guidelines between law enforcement and 
public health, thus determining roles and responsibilities prior to an event 
actually occurring. These guidelines help to address many of the actual or 
perceived challenges and barriers to collaboration by outlining investigational 
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procedures for the response to a biological threat or other naturally occurring 
incidents. In addition, MOU/protocols help establish consistent procedures among
law enforcement and public health regardless of personnel rotation over time. 
In general, the MOU/joint protocols outline some of the components 
discussed above: information sharing triggers, joint threat assessments, and
joint investigations. Additional information that could be helpful to incorporate
into a MOU includes sharing of investigative results and the analysis of 
information (e.g., agreement on appropriate methods for handling clinical 
specimens and environmental samples and how information obtained from 
these sources will be shared). The development of a MOU/joint protocols is
a difficult task, requiring the input and agreement of many entities within law 
enforcement and public health. To assist public health and law enforcement 
with the creation of an MOU/joint protocols, a model MOU for joint investigations 
was developed. While the model MOU is based on statutes, regulations and 
authorities in the United States of America, its principles and concepts can be 
generalized and utilized by other countries. 
To obtain a copy of the model MOU send an email request to: 
phlawprogram@cdc.gov. 
Joint Training/Exercises 
Once relationships are established and MOU/joint protocols are developed, 
public health and law enforcement need to be trained in order to be proficient 
in joint investigations activities. It is important to already have MOU/joint 
protocols in place prior to conducting an exercise (and not using an exercise to 
create the joint protocol). Creating a joint training/exercise program will enable 
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public health and law enforcement to test, evaluate and refine their protocols. 
Amending protocols to reflect lessons learned from an exercise is particularly 
important to ensure best practices evolve and are strengthened over time. 
Additionally, as new individuals are trained, it allows public health and law 
enforcement to continually build relationships with their counterparts and gain 
familiarity and expertise with joint investigations principles and methods prior 
to an actual incident. 
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SUMMARY 
This handbook provides an overview of law enforcement 
and public health roles and responsibilities and identifies 
the Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Model 
as a best practice to more effectively prepare for and 
respond to a biological threat. By implementing elements 
(e.g., increasing information sharing, conducting joint 
threat assessments and conducting joint investigations/
joint interviews) of the Joint Criminal-Epidemiological 
Investigations Model, law enforcement and public health 
can maximize their resources and achieve their individual 
and common goals during the response to a biological 
threat. 
The procedures and methodologies described are intended 
to serve as a guide. Law enforcement and public health 
should modify this guidance to accommodate the specific 
needs, statutes and authorities of their agency, 
jurisdiction, or country. 
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Key Highlights of Introduction
•		 The intentional release of a biological agent may initially 
be difficult to discern from a natural outbreak, which can 
result in separate law enforcement and public health 
investigations. 
•		 It is in public health and law enforcement’s best interest 
to work together when first investigating a suspicious 
biological outbreak, which includes fostering mutual 
awareness and establishing joint communication 
procedures. 
•		 By working together, public health and law enforcement 
can achieve their separate but often overlapping 
objectives of identifying the biological agent, preventing 
the spread of the disease, preventing public panic, 
and apprehending those responsible. 
•		 Law enforcement and public health are encouraged 
to read the entire handbook and not limit their review 
to just their respective sections, so each community 
can understand the different goals and needs of the 
other organization. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Key Highlights of Public Health 
•		 The ultimate aim of an epidemiological investigation 
is to identify the source of the disease and implement 
efforts to control the outbreak and protect the 
public’s health. 
•	 An epidemiological investigation primarily involves 
the meticulous accumulation of information from 
patient interviews as well as data collected from 
surveillance systems. 
•		 Goals of an epidemiological investigation include: 
• Stopping the spread of disease (identify causative 
agent, determine source, mode of transmission 
and population at risk) 
• Protecting the public’s health (surveillance, 

medical countermeasures, public education) 

• Protecting public health and other response 
personnel (protective equipment and preventive 
vaccines/medications) 
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•		 Important elements of an epidemiological investigation are: 
• Detect unusual events 
• Confirm diagnosis 
• Identify and characterize additional cases 
• Determine source of exposure 
• Develop and implement interventions 
•		 Laboratory analysis of clinical specimens is used 
to assist the physician in making a definitive 
diagnosis. While most physicians will wait for 
definitive laboratory results to confirm a biological 
threat agent diagnosis, physicians are likely to 
begin treatment before laboratory test results are 
confirmed since early treatment of disease increases 
the probability the patient will recover from the illness. 
•		 A laboratory that tests for biological agents should 
meet applicable standards (e.g., quality control 
measures, biosafety, biosecurity) and participate 
in relevant proficiency testing. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Key Highlights of Law Enforcement 
•		 Primary goals of a criminal investigation for a biological
threat include: 
• To protect the health and safety of the public 
• To prevent subsequent attacks 
• To identify, apprehend, and prosecute the 
perpetrators 
• To protect law enforcement personnel 
•		 If public health and law enforcement have established a 
working relationship prior to a biological threat incident, 
public health may feel more comfortable contacting law 
enforcement early in their investigation.
•		 Law enforcement should include various subject matter 
experts, such as public health, to assist in determining 
the credibility of a biological threat. 
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•	 Once there is suspicion that a crime has occurred, 
chain of custody procedures should be implemented 
by both law enforcement and public health to ensure 
accountability of evidence. Failure to properly maintain 
the chain of custody may render evidence unusable 
at trial. 
•		 In certain situations the environment might be 
contaminated. Therefore, it is useful to have
specially trained law enforcement teams to handle
apprehension of the suspect and collection of 
evidence in contaminated environments. 
•		 The need for rapid collection and testing to save lives 
outweighs normal evidence collection procedures. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Key Highlights of Joint Criminal and 
Epidemiological Investigations Model 
•		 The Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations 
Model is made up of six strategic elements: 
• Building relationships 
• Information sharing 
• Joint threat assessment 
• Joint Investigation 
• Memorandum of Understanding/Joint Protocols 
• Joint training/exercises 
•	 Benefits to conducting joint investigations: 
• Law enforcement has access to public health 
experts who understand disease epidemiology 
and can provide relevant medical information. 
• Public health has access to law enforcement 
case information which could assist in identifying 
the source of exposure and containing an outbreak. 
•	 The timely exchange of information in the early 
stages of a response is critical. Both disciplines 
have access to unique information that could help 
to prevent or detect a biological threat. 
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•		 A joint threat assessment, which utilizes the unique 
expertise of both disciplines, can help determine 
more quickly the nature of the incident (intentional 
or natural) and lead to a more appropriate response 
to the threat. 
•		 A joint investigation can maximize the efficiency 
for both law enforcement and public health in the 
event of a biological threat through the exchange 
of real-time investigative information. 
•	 MOU/joint protocols between law enforcement and 
public health are critical in determining roles and 
responsibilities prior to an event occurring and help 
ensure consistent practices between the disciplines. 
Important information to include in MOU/joint protocols
include: information sharing triggers, joint threat 
assessments, joint investigations, joint interviews, 
and methods for sharing investigative results. 
•	 Joint training and exercises are important elements 
of the Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations 
Model since it allows public health and law enforcement
to test, evaluate and refine their protocols. Amending 
protocols to reflect lessons learned from an exercise 
is particularly important to ensure best practices 
evolve and are strengthened over time. 
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Appendix 1: Sample Procedure for a Joint Threat Assessment 
To assist in the response to a biological threat, it is recommended that law 
enforcement and public health develop protocols to conduct a joint threat 
assessment between agencies. The following procedure is intended to serve 
as a guide; law enforcement and public health may wish to adapt the procedures
below to better suit the needs of their agencies. 
Upon receiving a report indicating a potential biological threat, public health 
should immediately notify law enforcement to conduct a joint threat assessment. 
The purpose of the joint threat assessment is to determine the likelihood of an 
intentional incident and identify response actions that should be performed by 
law enforcement and public health. 
It is recommended that the joint threat assessment be conducted by a conference 
call and, at a minimum, include the following representatives: 
• Law enforcement (trained in WMD response) 
• Public health (epidemiologist, clinician, laboratorian) 
• Communications (law enforcement and public health) 
The agenda of the conference call may include: 
• Incident briefing by public health 
• Explanation of concern by public health 
• Update on confirmed or suspected cases 
• Demographic information: gender, age, race, ethnicity, occupation, 
religious affiliation, membership in any groups or associations. 
• Description of where patient lives (e.g., urban, rural) 
• Patient’s recent travel history (e.g., domestic or international) 
• Recent activities that may be related to exposure and illness 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•		 Current laboratory test results 
•		 Hypotheses regarding source of exposure 
•		 Syndromic surveillance: any unusual patterns of disease 
presentation or geographical clustering of disease 
•		Law enforcement information/intelligence 
•		 Information on existing threats in the jurisdiction
	
(WMD or otherwise)
	
•		 WMD intelligence that may be connected to case’s 
exposure (e.g., religious affiliation, group, association) 
•		 Intelligence regarding acquisition or intended use of any 
biological threat agent, which may be related to the 
case’s symptoms 
The joint threat assessment members will then assess the possibility that 
the incident may be intentional. If information needed to conduct an initial 
assessment is unavailable, judgment may be temporarily suspended until 
such information is obtained. If there is enough information to make a 
determination, the incident may be classified into one of three risk categories. 
While the incident may be initially assessed at one of the risk levels below 
(Table 1), it may be changed as the investigation begins and new information 
is collected. 
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Risk 
Classification 
Evidence Leading 
to Classification 
Public Health 
Actions 
Law Enforcement 
Actions 
No 
Bioterrorism Risk: 
Highly likely that 
source of exposure 
occurred naturally 
No evidence to suggest 
intentional release 
Continue to manage 
the incident 
No further action 
needed 
Possible Public health investiga- Conduct an Query intelligence 
Bioterrorism Risk:
Possibility that 
tion has not revealed a
likely exposure 
epidemiological 
investigation to 
databases for 
relevant information/ 
exposure may be Unusual/unexplainable determine source intelligence; if 
intentional circumstances exist of exposure; if applicable, share 
regarding patient’s applicable, share law enforcement in-
infection with biological public health formation with public
threat agent (e.g. agent
is not common or
endemic to area) 
information with law 
enforcement partners
health partners 
The event itself, while
appearing to be non-
credible, may draw me-
dia or law enforcement
attention, which implies
an intentional act 
Likely Lab results are positive Initiate a joint Initiate a joint 
Bioterrorism Risk: for a biological threat investigation investigation 
Reasonable belief 
that exposure was 
intentional 
agent 
No known natural source
to explain infection 
Open case to 
investigate criminal 
intent and/or 
No known risk factors
for disease occurrence 
Intelligence and/or law
enforcement suggest
event is criminal/
intentional 
suspicious 
circumstances 
Table 1. Three risk categories used to classify bioterrorism risk. 
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Appendix 2: Sample Procedure for Joint Interviews 
An initial component of the joint investigation will focus on interviews with 
patients, relatives and potential contacts to determine the source of exposure to 
the biological threat agent. A joint interview might include the following actions: 
•		 Initial meeting between law enforcement and public health 

(prior to hospital visit)
	
•		 Determination of staging area to review the interview strategy 
•		 Introduction to the hospital administrator and interview of physician 
•		 Joint public health/law enforcement interview of patient 
•		 Post-interview review 
It is recommended that law enforcement and public health exchange information 
as soon as possible in order to assess the possibility that a biological threat 
exists. Therefore, it is likely that joint interviews will occur as a part of the initial 
response activities to a suspected biological threat incident. The following sample 
joint interview procedures are intended to serve as a guide and may not be 
applicable in all circumstances. Law enforcement and public health may wish to 
adapt the procedures below to better suit the needs of their agencies. 
Initial Meeting 
Prior to conducting an interview, it is recommended that law enforcement and 
public health meet in-person to discuss the current investigative information and 
review procedures for the joint interview. If an in-person meeting is not feasible 
due to time constraints, a conference call between joint interview participants
is an alternative. If multiple joint interviews are going to be conducted at one 
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location, it is recommended that a Joint Interview Team Lead be assigned 
to coordinate interview teams and arrange follow-up meetings or conference 
calls. An agenda for the initial meeting/conference call might include the 
following elements: 
•		 The public health investigator will: 
•		 Provide an overview of the epidemiological investigation 
•		 Provide a short briefing regarding the disease agent 
(i.e., incubation period; how it is transmitted; cases per 
year in the immediate area, and the country) 
•		 Recommend the appropriate level of Personal Protection 
Equipment (PPE) and prophylaxis, if necessary 
•		 The law enforcement investigator will review all current WMD threats, 
intelligence, and reporting, which may be relevant to the situation 
•		 The Joint Interview Team Leader will create law enforcement/
public health interview teams and address any specific logistical require-
ments (e.g., translators) 
Once the decision to conduct joint interviews has been made, agencies and 
jurisdictions should continue to re-evaluate the needs and the benefits gained
by having both law enforcement and public health present during interviews. 
Although a joint interview with law enforcement can provoke anxiety in the 
patient, one interview with both agencies present may be less disruptive to 
the patient than two or more separate interviews repeating similar information. 
Additionally, separate questioning by law enforcement and public health may 
lead to conflicting statements, which can jeopardize the outcome of the 
criminal investigation. 
 
 
 
      
     
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Staging Operations 
Prior to arrival at the interview location (e.g., hospital, clinic or home) each 
joint interview team should meet at a staging area to review the interview 
strategy, determine how introductions to the subject of the interview will 
occur, and identify any other miscellaneous items that need to be considered. 
According to standard law enforcement procedures, background checks (i.e., 
criminal history) will be conducted on patients/contacts who are interviewed.
Any relevant law enforcement data, including related intelligence or threat 
information, will be shared with public health at this staging area, prior to the
interview. If appropriate, modifications to the interview questions should be 
made based upon information provided by law enforcement. Following the 
interview, law enforcement and public health should utilize the same or alternate
staging area to discuss and review the interview notes.
Introduction to Hospital Administrator and Interview of Attending Physician 
(or Infection Control Practitioner) 
If the interview is being conducted in a hospital or other medical facility, the 
interview team will likely need to brief the hospital or facility administration on 
the biological threat incident and provide them with an update on the activities 
that will be performed at the location. Public health should initiate contact 
with the administration since they may have a prior working relationship. The 
interview team will explain that public health and law enforcement personnel 
will be interviewing a patient(s) at their facility. Whenever possible, the interview 
will be conducted in a manner that minimizes disruption to normal hospital 
operations and patient care. It should be determined if the patient is in a private 
room, and if not, a request should be made to move the patient to a private 
area, if feasible, where the interview can be conducted. 
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Upon arrival at the hospital or medical facility, public health will ask to speak 
first with the patient’s attending physician. Public health will explain the purpose 
of the patient interview and the reason for the presence of law enforcement. 
The following information should be collected from the attending physician: 
•		 Reason for patient admission to the hospital 
•	 Physician initial contact and involvement with the case 

(i.e., How did the physician become involved?)
	
•		 Overview of patient medical history 
•		 Opinion as to the level of cooperation that can be expected 

by the patient and any suggestions that may facilitate the 

interview process 
•		 Consent to make introductions between patient and 

interviewers (Note: the physician would not normally be 

present during the interview)
	
Interview 
During the interview of a patient in a hospital or other medical facility, the joint 
interview team should make every effort to be sensitive to the patient’s 
concerns and needs. During the interview, the patient’s medical needs take 
priority over conducting the interview. There may be numerous interruptions 
by medical staff to attend to the needs of the patient. During this time any 
discussion of sensitive information should be temporarily discontinued. Prior 
to entering the patient’s room, the interview team should apply the appropriate 
level of personalprotective equipment (PPE), as instructed by medical personnel 
or public health. Generally, the first part of the interview is conducted by public 
health and the second part by law enforcement. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
If not already introduced by the attending physician, public health will introduce 
herself/himself, identify the law enforcement investigator, and explain the purpose 
of the joint interview and the reason for law enforcement’s presence, which is to 
determine if the patient may have been a victim of a crime. An example of what 
public health may say to the patient is as follows: 
•		 “Due to the nature of your illness, we need to ensure that you have 
not been a victim of a crime. In order to do that, we will be asking 
standard questions to determine the nature of your exposure. Since 
much of this information is relevant to ensuring you have not been 
a victim of a crime, our standard procedure for [disease/agent] is 
to ask law enforcement to be present during this interview,” or 
•		 “Our public health protocol for cases of [disease/agent] is to 

involve law enforcement in order to rule out the possibility that 

a crime has occurred.”
	
In some situations the patient may feel vulnerable due to their condition, and 
the presence of law enforcement, while not in uniform, can create additional 
anxiety. Therefore, the interview team should try to minimize the patient’s stress 
during the interview. For example, the interviewers should sit in chairs during the 
interview, rather than standing over the patient. In other instances, the patient 
may refuse to have law enforcement present during the interview (e.g., he/she 
may be worried about crimes that he/she may have committed or immigration 
status in the country). If the patient states he/she is unwilling to answer any 
questions with law enforcement present, but will answer questions from public 
health, law enforcement should leave the room so that public health can continue 
with the standard public health interview. If this occurs, public health needs to 
be mindful of the types of information that may be relevant to law enforcement. 
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They should try to collect this additional information as part of their interview. 
Once the interview is complete, law enforcement will meet with public health 
at a pre-designated area to discuss the interview results. 
It is recommended that law enforcement not pursue prosecutorial efforts 
related to minor or petty crimes that the patient discloses during the interview 
since they may be unrelated to the biological threat investigation. Additionally, 
pursuing these minor or petty crimes may compromise the epidemiological 
investigation, which can delay or prevent the identification of the exposure. 
While law enforcement should prioritize investigative efforts related to the 
biological threat, they may have a need to seek prosecution of those minor 
crimes at a later date.This issue should be openly discussed with public health. 
Since a possibility exists that one of the individuals interviewed may be the 
subject (or related to the subject) responsible for the biological threat incident, 
public health should be aware that law enforcement may try several techniques 
to determine the credibility of the patient during their portion of the interview. 
Law enforcement may ask questions which seem repetitive or awkward to public 
health. It is recommended that public health allow law enforcement to proceed 
without interruption, unless there is an urgent need to meet outside the room to 
discuss the interview strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public health may need to collect some additional information through use of a 
standardized survey instrument or questionnaire, either as part of the interview 
or afterwards. An epidemiological investigation involves statistical analysis of 
data obtained using a standardized survey instrument or questionnaire. The 
statistical analysis is essential in providing public health with mathematical 
evidence to confirm or reject a hypothesis, which is used to develop and 
implement an intervention to prevent people from becoming ill. 
As a general rule, the patient will not be physically examined in the presence of 
law enforcement, unless circumstances dictate that law enforcement be present 
in the room. Additionally, if the patient is a minor, the parents must be present 
during the law enforcement portion of the interview. If appropriate, the joint 
interview team may leave their personal business cards with the individual. 
Post-Interview Review 
Once the interview is complete, law enforcement and public health should meet 
to discuss their interview notes and ensure there are no discrepancies. If law 
enforcement requires copies of patient medical information, public health will 
provide this information to law enforcement once they have checked to determine
applicability under relevant privacy statutes. It is also recommended that public 
health remove any sensitive patient medical information that is not pertinent to 
the criminal investigation. Further questioning of the individual should be coordi-
nated between the agencies and jurisdictions to ensure that law enforcement
and public health both have an opportunity to participate. 
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Information Sharing Considerations Following the Interview 
•	 Information provided to law enforcement from public health 
is considered “Public Health Sensitive” and should be marked 
as such; prior to releasing such information to other agencies, 
public health must authorize such a release. 
•	 Information provided to public health from law enforcement is 
considered “Law Enforcement Sensitive” and should be marked 
as such; this information should not be disseminated unless law 
enforcement approves the release. 
•	 Information such as immigration status is particularly sensitive 
information and release of such information could jeopardize 
patient’s willingness to cooperate with public health. 
•	 Information that indicates a patient has a history of violent crime 
must be passed immediately back to public health due to safety 
considerations. 
•	 If the criminal database check reveals a non-terrorism criminal 
history (e.g., warrant for arrest; location of fugitive in local, state 
or federal warrant), law enforcement may need to pursue its own 
separate investigation, but only after first consulting with public 
health to minimize any impact on the epidemiological investigation. 
•	 Information obtained or developed by law enforcement may 
be sensitive in nature or classified, but may relate to the 
epidemiological investigation. Should this situation arise, this 
information will be provided to public health by law enforcement 
through an authorized procedure. 
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Appendix 3 – Sample Joint Interview Questions 
Personal Information 
1) Patient’s name* 
2) Patient’s date of birth* 
3) Sex* 
4) Patient’s address* 
5) Patient’s occupation or employment (describe job and where patient 
works or goes to school)* 
6) Patient’s race/ethnicity/nationality* 
7) Patient’s level of education 
8) Personal information above may also be needed for family members* 
Travel information 
1) Has the patient traveled outside of the country (during the incubation 
period)? If yes, where? 
2) Has the patient traveled away from home (during the incubation 
period)? If yes, where? 
3) What is the patient’s normal mode of transportation and route to/from 
work (during incubation period)? 
4) Has the patient been to new or unique locations (e.g., a park, farm, 
wilderness area or body of water)? 
*Refers to information that public 
health may normally collect using a 
standard questionnaire. 
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Patient’s address (or location where exposure may have taken place) 
1) In what type of community does the patient live (rural vs. urban, 
heavy crime area)? 
2) If the patient rents his/home, what is his/her landlord’s name? 
3) Who has access (keys) to the patient’s residence (e.g., roommates, 
parents, landlord)? 
Incident Information 
1) Has the patient received or heard any threats or unusual statements? 
Does the patient know if he/she is the subject of a threat (future or 
past)? Does the patient know anyone who has been the recipient of 
a threat? Has the patient’s employer been the subject of a threat? 
2) Did the patient see an unusual device or anyone spraying something 
or anything else (envelope with unknown substance) that could 
disperse a biological threat agent? 
3) If patient attended a large event in the last 30 days, was there anything 
suspicious that occurred during the event? Any threats received at the 
event (or prior)? 
4) Did the patient visit a laboratory or come in contact with any laboratory 
equipment? Does the patient know of anyone who works in a laboratory
with biological or chemical agents? 
5) Does the patient know why he/she feels they may have gotten sick? 
6) Does the patient know anyone else who is sick? For example, 
someone with a fever and cough or unusual looking sores or rashes? 
7) Has the patient seen or touched any dead animals? Does the patient 
have pets that may be sick? 
  
 
 
8) Does the patient have any affiliations with high profile people (e.g., 
actors, politicians) 
9) Has the patient received anything unusual from a foreign country? 
10) Has the patient consumed anything unusual? 
11) Has the patient reported being bitten by insects or arthropods? 
86 
87 Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 – Role of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations 
and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Introduction 
Following the 2001 incident involving the intentional distribution of Bacillus 
anthracis through the mail system in the United States of America, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
worked together to develop the Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations 
Model, increasing collaboration between the agencies. Many of the general 
public health, law enforcement and joint investigation activities described in 
this handbook were initially developed and tested in the United States. This 
section provides additional details on Federal Bureau of Investigations and 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention roles and responsibilities that 
support the implementation of the Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations 
Model in the United States of America. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
The FBI is the primary agency of the U.S. Federal Government with the authority 
and responsibility to investigate threats to national security, including biological 
threats, within the United States and relating to U.S. citizens and interests 
overseas. Along with the FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., there are 
numerous FBI field offices located in major cities throughout the United States. 
These field offices implement national level policy at the local level, where they 
are able to tailor their outreach to reflect the particular geographic threats and 
vulnerabilities unique to their specific jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The FBI has multiple operational units to provide assistance in the event of 
a terrorist attack, including response teams trained in handling hazardous 
materials, evidence, and explosives. These teams provide expertise to the 
FBI field offices and other law enforcement agencies in both the United States 
and other countries. The FBI also has specially trained personnel, such as 
microbiologists and other scientists, qualified to collect contaminated evidence. 
There is a common conception that the FBI prosecutes cases; however, 
this is incorrect. The FBI gathers facts and evidence and then presents the
results to the Department of Justice, who then decides whether or not to bring 
the case to trial. Therefore, during a suspicious biological incident, the FBI 
would work closely with public health to investigate whether the outbreak is 
criminal in nature and if so, gather evidence to build a case for prosecution 
of those responsible. 
FBI WMD Coordinator 
The FBI has 56 field offices located in major U.S. cities, as well as nearly 400 
resident agencies in smaller towns (Figure 1). These offices allow the FBI to 
interact with local stakeholders and obtain unique geographic knowledge of 
their area of responsibility. Each field office has a designated Special Agent, 
called a WMD Coordinator, who serves as a WMD subject matter expert and 
point of contact for local and state emergency responders and public health. 
In the event of a bioterrorism event, the WMD Coordinator would act as a 
conduit for obtaining federal assistance (e.g., threat credibility evaluation and 
operational response) for local law enforcement. 
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Figure 1. Map of FBI Field Offices and Resident Agencies 
FBI International Efforts 
The resources of the FBI are available to assist all law enforcement agencies 
throughout the world. FBI resources can be requested through the FBI Legal  
Attaché Office. The FBI has Legal Attaché personnel located in almost 70  
countries throughout the world. The mission of these Legal Attaché offices is  
to foster strategic partnerships with foreign law enforcement, intelligence, and  
security services by sharing knowledge, experience, capabilities, and exploring 
joint operational opportunities. FBI Special Agents with specific expertise in  
WMD matters are located in Tblisi, Georgia, and Singapore, Singapore. The  
FBI also coordinates extensively with INTERPOL and has a Special Agent with 
expertise in WMD stationed at the INTERPOL Headquarters in Lyon, France. 
FBI Legal Attaché contact information may be found at: 
http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/legat 
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Joint Terrorism Task Force 
In an effort to promote communication and collaboration across the various law 
enforcement entities, the United States implements a partnership called the 
Joint Terrorism Task Force. These task forces combine the resources and
knowledge of various federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to 
maximize the United States’ collective ability to combat terrorism. Often 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs) are developed between participating 
law enforcement agencies to assist in determining in advance how law 
enforcement agencies can best prevent and respond to a terrorist event. The 
National Joint Terrorism Task Force is headquartered in Washington, D.C., 
and there are over one hundred area-specific Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
nationwide (many located at FBI field offices). 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
The Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) is the United States government’s 
principal agency for protecting the health of all 
Americans and a leader in promoting activities 
associated with the medical and public health 
response to a biological incident. As an entity 
of DHHS, CDC plays a critical role in leading the nation’s public health efforts 
in strengthening capacity to detect and respond to a biological incident. To 
carry out these efforts, CDC conducts critical science and provides health
information that protects the U.S. against health threats and responds when 
these arise.In the United States, the response to a public health emergency, 
including an intentional release of a pathogen, is the responsibility of public 
health at the state and/or local level, with CDC providing support to its
state/local partners.All states and territories possess laws that require reporting 
of specific infectious diseases by healthcare providers. It is mandatory that 
Public health response 
begins at the local level, 
since they will likely be 
the first to recognize 
cases of illness. 
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reportable disease cases be reported to state and territorial jurisdictions when 
identified by a health provider, hospital, or laboratory. Each state has its own 
laws and regulations defining what diseases are reportable and the list varies 
among states and over time. In addition, notifiable disease cases are voluntarily 
reported to CDC by state and territorial jurisdictions (without direct personal 
identifiers) for nationwide aggregation and monitoring of disease data. 
Since a biological incident can occur in a variety of locations and populations, 
the FBI, CDC, and the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) 
established the Laboratory Response Network (LRN). The mission of the 
LRN is to develop, maintain, and strengthen an integrated national and 
international network of laboratories that can respond quickly to needs for 
rapid testing, timely notification, and secure reporting of results that are 
associated with acts of biological terrorism or other high-consequence 
public health emergencies. All LRN member laboratories work under a 
single operational plan and adhere to strict policies of safety and security. 
CDC International Efforts 
The CDC’s global health programs, research, and training activities improve 
health and save lives around the world and protect Americans from diseases 
and other health threats that begin overseas. Collaborating with other federal 
agencies and international partners, the CDC helps other countries build 
capacity to prevent, rapidly detect and effectively respond to emerging infectious 
diseases and biological threats, whether they occur naturally, are intentionally 
produced, or are the result of laboratory accidents. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
   
 
   
 
  
  
Appendix 5 – U.S. Bio-Related Laws to Prevent Bioterrorism 
The United States has implemented federal laws criminalizing the deliberate 
misuse of biological material, as required under Article IV of the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC). The FBI and law enforcement community as 
a whole enforce these laws and hold U.S. citizens responsible for violations. 
Additionally, a threat involving a disease-causing organism or toxin is a criminal 
act, whether or not the perpetrator actually possesses the agent or toxin. 
These laws, which can be found in the U.S. Federal Criminal Code, include: 
18 USC 175 (Bio-Specific Laws) 
§ 175(a) • Crime to knowingly develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, acquire, retain, 
or knowingly possess any bio agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as 
weapon, or assists foreign state or organization to do so, or attempt, 
threaten or conspire to do so. 
• Note: “for use as a weapon” means to attempt to develop, produce, stockpile, 
retain, or transfer bio agents with intent to harm; actual harm does not have 
to occur to be charged with the crime 
§ 175(b) • Crime to knowingly possess a biological agent, toxin, or delivery system if
not reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research or
other peaceful purpose. Note this applies to any biological agent, not just
select agents.
• Defines bio agent, toxin, and “for use as weapon” to protect justified research 
and bio industry. 
§ 175b • Part a: No restricted person may ship, transport, or receive any select agent
or toxin in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce
• Part b: Crime to transfer select agent to person who is not registered with
Select Agent Program
• Part c: Crime to knowingly posses select agent, regardless of intent, if not
registered with the Select Agent Program 
• Part d: Defines “select agent” and “restricted person”
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18 USC 2332a – (Threatened Use of WMD) 
§ 2332a • Crime to conspire, threaten, attempt, or use a WMD against person or property
of United States 
18 USC 842(p) – (Distribution of WMD Information) 
§ 842(p) • Crime to teach or demonstrate use of or making of explosive, destructive device,
or WMD, or to distribute any information pertaining to the manufacture or use of
an explosive, destructive device, or WMD, knowing that person intends to use
such information for an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence. 
18 USC 1038 – (False Information and Hoaxes) 
§ 1038 • Crime to engage in conduct with intent to convey false or misleading information
under circumstances where such information may reasonably be believed and
concerning an activity that is a violation of a predicate offense (including WMD
offenses). 
U.S. Federal Criminal Code (continued) In the United States, a select agent 
is a biological agent or toxin that has been determined by the United States 
to have potential to pose a severe threat to public, animal, or plant health. 
The U.S. government manages a Select Agent Program which restricts the 
possession, use, and transfer of such agents to all entities within the United 
States, regardless of whether they are public or private entities. 
U.S. law requires that all entities possessing select agents must be registered, 
have security plans, and personnel with access to select agents receive an 
FBI Security Risk Assessment (SRA). The SRA is a series of database checks 
that aim to identify individuals who are legally restricted from accessing select 
agents based upon specific federal prohibitors (e.g., a fugitive from justice) that 
are listed in the USA PATRIOT Act and the Bioterrorism Response Act.  
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Appendix 6 – U.S. 2014 List of Select Agents and Toxins 
A select agent is a biological agent or toxin that has been determined by the 
United States to have potential to pose a severe threat to public, animal, or 
plant health. The United States implements the Select Agent Program, which 
restricts the possession, use, and transfer of such agents to all entities within 
the U.S., regardless if they are public or private entities. 
Of the current 65 select agents and toxins, 13 agents were designated as 
Tier 1. Tier 1 select agents are determined to have the greatest ability to 
produce a mass casualty event or devastating effects to the economy, high 
communicability, low infectious dose, and a history of weaponization. The 
Tier 1 designation allows for targeted enhancement of security measures 
to Tier 1 laboratories, while avoiding burdening other facilities that do not 
possess, use, or transfer Tier 1 select agents. 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulate the Select Agent List. Tier 1 
agents are in orange bold font and marked with an asterisk (*). 
HHS-Regulated Select Agents and Toxins
• Abrin 
• Botulinum neurotoxins * 
• Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of Clostridium * 
• Conotoxins1 
• Coxiella burnetii 
• Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus 
• Diacetoxyscirpenol 
1 Short, paralytic alpha conotoxins containing the following amino acid sequence X1CCX2PACGX3X4X5X6CX7 
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• Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus 
• Ebola virus * 
• Francisella tularensis * 
• Lassa fever virus 
• Lujo virus 
• Marburg virus * 
• Monkeypox virus 
• Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus2 
• Ricin 
• Rickettsia prowazekii 
• SARS-associated coronavirus 
• Saxitoxin 
• South American Hemorrhagic Fever viruses: 
• Chapare 
• Guanarito 
• Junin 
• Machupo 
• Sabia 
• Staphylococcal enterotoxins A,B,C,D,E subtypes 
• T-2 toxin 
• Tetrodotoxin 
• Tick-borne encephalitis complex (flavi) viruses: 
• Far Eastern subtype 
• Siberian subtype 
• Kyasanur Forest disease virus 
• Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus 
• Variola major virus (Smallpox virus) * 
• Variola minor virus (Alastrim) * 
• Yersinia pestis * 
2 Reconstructed replication competent forms of 1918 pandemic influenza virus containing any portion of coding regions of all eight
gene segments 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint HHS and USDA-Regulated Select Agents 
• Bacillus anthracis * 
• Bacillus anthracis Pasteur strain 
• Pasteur strain 
• Brucella abortus 
• Brucella melitensis 
• Brucella suis
• Burkholderia mallei * 
• Burkholderia pseudomallei * 
• Hendra virus 
• Nipah virus 
• Rift Valley fever virus 
• Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus 
USDA-Regulated Select Agents
Animals 
• African horse sickness virus 
• African swine fever virus 
• Avian influenza virus 
• Classical swine fever virus 
• Foot-and-mouth disease virus * 
• Goat pox virus 
• Lumpy skin disease virus 
• Mycoplasma capricolum 
• Mycoplasma mycoides 
• Newcastle disease virus 
• Peste des petits ruminants virus 
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• Rinderpest virus * 
• Sheep pox virus 
• Swine vesicular disease virus 
Plants 
• Peronosclerospora philippinensis 
• Phoma glycinicola 
• Ralstonia solanacearum 
• Rathayibacter toxicus 
• Sclerophthora rayssiae 
• Synchytrium endobioticum 
• Xanthomonas oryzae 
Source: Federal Select Agent Program (2014), Select agents and toxins list. Retrieved from: http://www.selectagents.gov/Select 
AgentsandToxinsList.html. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
     
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
Appendix 7 – U.S. National Response Framework 
There are several departments and agencies 
within the United States that have roles and 
responsibilities during a disaster or emergency.
In an effort to facilitate a coordinated and unified 
response, the United States implements its 
National Response Framework, which outlines 
guiding principles for all domestic response
partners during any type of emergency or 
disaster (local, state, or national-level). 
The National Response Framework: 
•		 Describes specific authorities and best practices for managing 
disaster or emergency incidents for national, state, and local 
authorities, as well as industry, nongovernmental, and 
community partners. 
•		 Allows governmental agencies to develop their own specific 
response plans, and those plans are exercised to identify and 
address conflicting roles and responsibilities. 
•		 Is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating 
structures to align key roles and responsibilities. 
•		 Covers capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property 
and the environment, and meet basic human needs after an 
incident has occurred. 
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It is noteworthy to underscore the importance of determining inter-governmental 
roles and responsibilities before a bioterrorism incident occurs to maximize the 
opportunity for a consistent, coordinated, and efficient nationwide response. Not 
all response plans are one-size-fits-all. An effective response plan should be 
tailored to fit the needs and capabilities of the country that is writing such a plan. 
When drafting a national response plan, it may be helpful to: 
•		 Methodically describe the “who, what, and how” of 

emergency preparedness and response.
	
•		 Describe not only federal roles, but also how state, local, 
industry, nongovernmental, and community partners would 
contribute to managing an emergency incident. 
•		 Incorporate lessons learned from past federal, state, or local 

exercises that may be applied across the national spectrum. 

The U.S. National Response Framework can be found at: 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 8 – International Obligations 
By proactively identifying how public health and law enforcement can work
together to better prepare for and respond to a suspicious biological incident,
these communities are working to uphold the fundamental goals of the Biological
Weapons Convention, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and
the International Health Regulations. These three agreements, which mutually
reinforce objectives of the Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Model,
are briefly summarized below.
Biological Weapons Convention 
To supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use (but not 
development) of chemical and biological weapons, the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) was created to prohibit the development of bioweapons. 
Specifically, BWC members agree to never develop, produce, stockpile, retain, 
or transfer biological agents or toxins (and associated equipment or means 
of delivery) that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes. While the BWC prohibits the development of bioweapons, 
it also strives to protect and promote the advancement of science for peaceful 
purposes. Article IV of the BWC requires nations to take national measures to 
implement the BWC domestically. Such measures include laws, regulations, 
and biosecurity measures that prohibit individuals from misusing biological 
material for nefarious purposes. The Joint Criminal-Epidemiological 
Investigations Model engages international partners to optimize identification, 
assessment and response to a biological threat. 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 
In an effort to respond to the role non-state actors play in WMD proliferation, 
the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540), 
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which imposes binding obligations on all States to adopt legislation to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and establish
domestic controls to prevent illicit trafficking of such material. Resolution 1540 is
unique in that it identifies WMD as a new dimension of proliferation, focuses on
States preventing non-State actors from acquiring WMD, and fills the gap in other
nonproliferation treaties such as the BWC, Chemical Weapons Convention, and
Nonproliferation Treaty. Article 2 of Resolution 1540 requires nations to adopt and
enforce laws which prohibit non-state actors from manufacturing, acquiring,
possessing, developing, transporting, and transferring WMD and their means of
delivery.  Article 3 requires nations to maintain effective law enforcement efforts
to detect, deter, prevent, and combat the illicit trafficking and brokering of WMD,
which might be detected during a joint investigation between public health and
law enforcement.
International Health Regulations 
The International Health Regulations (IHR) are an international legal instrument
that is binding on 196 countries worldwide, including all members of the World
Health Organization (WHO). Their aim is to help nations to detect, assess, report
and respond to public health emergencies of international concern, with the intent
to mitigate the consequences of the event before it spreads across borders. The
IHR provides guidance for Member States to assess and manage serious health
threats, to include biological outbreaks, which can be natural or criminal in nature.
Fundamental aspects of the IHR include developing, strengthening, and
maintaining public health capacities for surveillance and response. The Joint
Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Model supports the IHR by bringing
public health and law enforcement together to more effectively respond to a
iological threat in real time. This, in turn, allows local stakeholders to implement
control measures immediately, report essential information to appropriate
authorities, and ultimately preserve public health and safety.
   
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 9 - Common Public Health and Law Enforcement Terminology 
Overlapping words used by both public health and law enforcement but have 
different meanings: 
Word Description 
Agent Public Health: A pathogen  
Law Enforcement: A law enforcement officer 
Case Public Health: An infected patient 
Law Enforcement: An investigation 
Evidence Public Health: Scientific data used to establish truth or falsehood  
Law Enforcement: Information or material presented to a court or jury to
support a claim or belief; examples may include the testimony of witnesses,
records, documents, or objects 
Source Public Health: The person, animal, or substance from which an infectious 
agent passed 
Law Enforcement: Someone or something (usually confidential) that provides
law enforcement with information 
Surveillance Public Health: Continuous, systematic collection, analysis and interpretation 
of health-related data needed for the planning, implementation, and
evaluation of public health practice 
Law Enforcement: Observing or monitoring a person, group, etc. 
Suspect Public Health: A person who may be a case (infected patient) 
Law Enforcement: A person under suspicion 
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Common words used by public health officials:
	
Word Description 
Carrier A person or animal that harbors an infectious agent for a disease 
that can transmit it to others, but does not demonstrate symptoms 
of the disease 
Cluster A group of disease (or other health-related condition) cases, which 
are closely grouped in time and place. 
Communicable An illness caused by an infectious agent or its toxins that occurs 
through direct or indirect transmission from an infected individual, 
animal, vector or the environment to a susceptible host. 
Contagious Capable of being transmitted from one person to another by contact 
or close proximity. 
Determinants 
of health 
Factors which influence the health status of an individual 
and/or population. 
Endemic The constant presence of a disease or infectious agent within a given 
geographic area or population group. 
Epidemic The occurrence of more cases of disease than expected in a given 
area or among a specific group of people over a particular period 
of time. 
Epidemiology The study of the distribution and determinants of health-related states 
or events in specified populations, and the application of this study to 
control of health problems. 
Etiological agent The infectious agent that causes an infection or disease 
Exposure Any factor that may be associated with the infection or disease 
Immunity Resistance developed in response to an antigen (infecting agent or 
vaccine), usually characterized by the presence of antibody produced 
by the host. 
Incubation period The time interval from exposure to an infectious agent to the onset 
of symptoms of an infectious disease. 
Index case The first case or instance of a patient coming to the attention 
of health authorities. 
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Word Description 
Infectious Capable of causing infection or disease by entrance of the 
infectious agent in to the body, which then grows and multiplies. 
Infectivity The ability of a disease agent to enter, survive, and multiply in a host. 
Isolation The physical separation of individuals with a contagious infectious
illness from healthy individuals that have not been exposed to the 
biological agent. 
Morbididy The number of people with illness in a defined population, location
or other grouping of interest. 
Mortality A measure of deaths in a defined population, location, or other 
grouping of interest. 
Outbreak The occurrence of more cases of disease (typically related or 
with a common cause) than expected in a given area or among a 
specific group of persons during a specific period of time. 
Pandemic An epidemic occurring over a very wide area (several countries or
continents) and usually affecting a large proportion of the population.
Pathogenicity The ability of an organism to cause disease after infection. 
Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) 
Equipment worn to minimize exposure to hazards, including 
contact with biological, chemical, radiological, physical, electrical, 
mechanical, or other hazards. Examples include gloves, foot and
eye protection, protective hearing devices, hard hats, respirators, 
and full body suits 
Quarantine The segregation of individuals, families, groups and communities 
that have been exposed to a contagious disease, but are not ill. 
Reservoir The habitat where an infectious agent normally lives, grows, and
multiplies, which can include humans, animals, or the environment.
Transmission Any mode or mechanism by which an infectious agent is spread 
to a susceptible host. 
Vector A living intermediary that carries an agent from a reservoir to a 
susceptible host (e.g., mosquitoes, fleas, ticks, etc.) 
Virulence The proportion of people with clinical disease, who after becoming
infected, become severely ill or die 
Zoonotic diseases Contagious diseases that are spread between animals and humans.
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Common words used by law enforcement officials:
	
Word Description 
Accomplice A person who helps another commit a crime.   
Adversary An enemy or opponent 
Allegation A claim that someone has done something wrong 
Affidavit A written declaration made under oath 
Arrest The deprivation of a person’s liberty by legal authority in response to a 
criminal charge 
Circumstantial 
Evidence 
Indirect evidence that tends to establish a conclusion by inference. 
Credible Threat A threat that has good grounds for being true (ex. information is from a 
reliable source). 
Custody Under the care or control of a legal authority; usually related to a person 
or item (i.e. evidence). 
Direct Evidence Evidence directly relating to the fact in dispute 
Elicitation Attempt to get an otherwise unwilling participant to reveal valuable 
information; usually done by strategic conversation . 
Felony A significant wrongdoing; usually results in 1+ years in prison. 
HazMat Hazardous Material (ex. flammable, radioactive, poisonous, etc) . 
Insider Threat An employee within an organization with intent to do harm (usually has 
ability to bypass many internal security measures). 
Intelligence The product produced through the process of collecting, analyzing, and 
developing raw information into useful data. 
Manipulation Exerting influence over someone for one’s own advantage 
Misdemeanor A minor wrongdoing; usually results in less than one year in prison. 
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Word Description 
Outside Threat Someone outside an organization/entity with intent to do harm. 
Physical Evidence Tangible items that contain information related to facts of a case. 
Probable Cause A reasonable basis for believing that a crime was committed and 
that the person committed it (for arrest) and that evidence of the 
crime is present in the place to be searched (for search) 
Probative Value Evidence which is sufficiently useful to prove something important in a
trial
Seizure The taking by legal authority of evidence in a criminal case. 
Threat 
Assessment 
Analysis of threatening behavior or action; used to evaluate potential
of violent actions. 
Threat 
Credibility 
Evaluation 
An assessment to determine how credible the threat is and what 
further action should be taken. Includes analyzing the threat’s 
technical feasibility, operational practicality, and intent.  
Warrant A document issued by a legal official authorizing police to make an 
arrest, search premises, or carry out other related actions. 
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